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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is striking how the efforts of the Euro­
pean Union to harmonize the laws of its differ­
ent member nations in order to create uniform 
European Union laws repeat the struggles of the 
United States to do the same, in the early years 
of the American union. There were a number of 
iterations of "harmonization" 200 years ago1 in 
the course of founding the U.S. and a civil war 
was fought 150 years ago over what Europeans 
today would call the subsidiarity issue. The 
American federal power sought to dominate ar­
eas which seemed to states to be of more local 
concern. Though the Civil War itself ended 
1 Articles of Federation and US constitution. 
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nearly 150 years ago, the tension- between Fed­
eral control and States' rights has never truly 
disappeared. 
Today in the United States, individual 
views about subsidiarity or "states' rights" often 
reflect attitudes towards those currently in 
power at the federal level. For example, many 
who in the U.S. would be characterized as po­
litically "conservative" were, for years, the 
strongest advocates of states' rights, at a time 
when the federal government was dominated by 
individuals with more progressive ("liberal"2) 
political orientation and agenda. "''hen, how­
ever, conservatives achieved federal power dur­
ing the Reagan-Bush years, the conservatives 
felt no restraint in applying federal force to as­
sert their own political perspectives over states 
with differing opinions. 
These experiences suggest that efforts to 
develop a European Union might glean some les­
sons from the U.S. experience. It is important 
to makc note, however, of one dimension of 
European nations that makes their circum­
stances different and therefore might lead to dif­
ferent results. European nations have deeper 
separate histories than the American states, and 
-_....._-_.... _----­
2 "Liberal" in the United States sense, i.e., more to the political 
left as opposed to Liberal in the European sense, i.e., more to the 
political right. 
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therefore more profoundly different cultures. 
This essay will focus on hostile business 
takeovers to illustrate the significance that cul­
tural differences among nations can play in de­
veloping a harmonized European Union law. The 
European Union has made several (so far unsuc­
cessful) efforts to develop a uniform regulation 
of these activities. Cultural differences among 
the several Union nations may have helped to 
thwart those efforts. 
Hostile takeover regulation can serve as 
an interesting example of the impact of cultural 
diversity, illustrating the differences and simi­
larities between U.S. Federal and State laws 
(both statutory and judicial) and the struggles 
that the current European Community now 
faces in developing its own rules and regula­
tions. It is generally believed among scholars 
and policy-makers that as nations increase their 
economic participation internationally, so will 
their economic laws and policies take on an in­
ternational scope. The received view is that 
those internationalizing nations' laws will each 
evolve and in so dOing, will naturally gravitate 
towards one another and result in uniform in­
ternational standards.3 The reasoning is that 
economic forces will cause each nation to de­
3 Roberta S. Karmel, "Is it Time for a Federal Corporation Law?", 57 
Brookljm Law Review 55, 90 (1991). 
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velop laws along efficient lines and as a result 
each nation's laws will ultimately meet each 
other with the same (efficient) standards. Fur­
thermore, not only will these separate efficiency 
processes generate uniform legal standards 
across those nations, but the standards evolved 
will be also the ones that are the most efficient 
for the international context. As significant at­
tention already has been given academically, 
judicially and legislatively to the subject of hos­
tile takeovers in the U.S. in the 1980's and the 
results are now viewed as essentially settled law, 
it seems quite natural for current European ana­
lysts to look to U.S. conclusions when consider­
ing the EU's and its member nations' efforts to 
address the matter for themselves. 4 Indeed many 
European scholars and policy-makers have done 
so. 
In the summer of 2001, however, a Hos­
tile Takeover Directive was put before the EU's 
European Parliament for approval, a proposal 
that was widely regarded as the successful cul­
mination of a 12-year collaborative effort to ef­
fectuate a common ground on the regulatory 
treatment of hostile takeovers within the EU 
countries, based on principles similar to the 
4 Guido Ferrarini, "Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contesta­
bility of Corporate Control," Company Law Reform in OECD Coun­
tries. A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, Conference Proceed­
ings (forthcoming 2001). 
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United States. The Directive was defeated, 
which was the first time since the EU's incep­
tion that a Directive of this magnitude did not 
succeed. It was defeated in a deadlock tie, in 
large part because of the influence of Germany. 
One of Germany's major companies had fallen 
victim to an international hostile takeover by a 
British company less than two years earlier. The 
economic importance of the two companies was 
so great that the takeover itself was the largest 
in history. Some of the German company's vul­
nerability was due to differences in Germany's 
"economic structure" and "social contract" and 
lack of takeover regulations as compared with 
Britain, the home of the hostile raider. Clearly 
finding common ground among 15 nations 
(which are now expanding to 25, with perhaps 
more to joinS), even regarding a well-defined 
topic such as hostile takeover regulation, is dif­
ficult to achieve and even more difficult to sus­
tain. 
The purpose of this essay is to raise a 
number of questions about "received theory" 
regarding the evolution of transnational uniform 
business law. First, a closer look at history will 
challenge the view that nations will naturally 
gravitate towards a uniform law. Second, review 
of the practicalities will question whether a 
5 Frank Bruni, "A10 Countries Sign to Join European Union," 
N. Y. Times, April 17th 2003 
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transnational uniform law in all its aspects is 
indeed necessary to have efficiency. Third, a 
look at actual cases suggests that the experience 
of the United States has not always yielded the 
most "efficient" solutions, at least with regard to 
economic matters, when applied to European 
circumstances. 
II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS - THE UNITED STATES' 

EXPERIENCE 

A. Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regulation 
A hostile takeover occurs when an indi­
vidual or corporation - the raider - seeks to ob­
tain ownership of enough shares to control an­
other corporation - the target (Revlon v .. McAn­
drews, 1986). What renders the activity hostile 
is when the target's management (and perhaps 
some of the current owners) resist the raiders' 
efforts to acquire the firm. For what purpose 
the raider plans to apply his control of the target 
company will vary but it is almost always moti­
vated by the raider's financial gain. 6 Some goals 
have been to break-up a conglomerate target to 
sell its component parts at a profit, to stream­
line and run a more profitable component, to 
replace an inefficient management or, more 
prevalently recently, to incorporate the target's 
6 Jack B. Jacobs, "Comments on Contestability," S4 Unk,€1'sity of 
Miami Law Review 847 (2000). 
[166] IUS GENTIUM· Fall 2003 
Regulation ofHostile Takeovers 
complementary assets into the raider's own for 
greater productivity and future profits. Though 
the purpose may vary, the method is the same. 
The raider announees publicly an offer to buy 
shares from current shareholders at a price 
greater than the share's current stock market 
price (the tender offer or bid). The method of 
payment may vary: cash, stock in the raider's 
company, bonds, etc., and the terms of the ten­
der may vary: for example, purchase will be ex­
ercised only on the condition that enough of the 
outstanding shares are offered to the raider to 
give it majority control in the target company. 
Each of the current shareholders then must de­
cide whether to tender his or her particular 
shares to this bid offer.7 
What makes the situation "hostile" is not 
the bid for the shares, but whether the man­
agement (and perhaps significant minority 
shareholders) of the target company is against 
this change in controL In the U.S., the Board of 
Directors has sole power to run the corporation. 
The shareholders' power is in their right to de­
termine the members of the Board through vot­
ing-rights based on shares owned. A typical tar­
get company, however, is a stock exchange­
listed firm whose owners by and large constitute 
a diffuse number of shareholders who are mostly 
7 Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corpo­
rate Jl.cquisitions, (2d cd. 1995). 
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inattentive to issues of management and 
unlikely to act concertedly if bothering to vote 
at all. As a result, the current incumbent man-
agement usually has default control over the 
Board's membership and has had so for some 
time. Sometimes the management in such situa-
tions is referred to as the "entrenched" man-
agement. Unless the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws preclude otherwise, if a majority share-
holder (one who owns over 50% of the voting 
shares) now emerges from the takeover efforts, 
then that shareholder can choose at least the 
majority, if not all, of the members of the Board 
and through them control the firm. 
It is most likely that the raider, upon 
successful acquisition of above 50% of the voting 
shares, will replace the incumbent Board with 
members of the raider's choosing to pursue the 
raider's plans for the company. Thus an incen-
tive arises for the incumbent Board to use its 
powers to thwart the success of the raider's ten-
der offer. Though this is not always the reason 
for management's resistance to external acquisi-
tion of its firm, it is one that is often proffered, 
at least by the acquiring raider. Other argu-
ments the defending management often gives for 
resisting the takeover is that the company will 
be more profitable remaining with the incum-
bent management or that the raider is not offer-
ing sufficient money for the shares. Though the 
arguments vary on both Sides, the arguments 
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begin when the attempt at acquisition becomes 
hostile rather than friendly. 
With the rise in the number of takeovers 
in the United States came a greater interest in 
the legal question of whether it was lawful for 
the Board to prevent its company's shareholders 
from accepting a tender offer bid at a premium 
price. Early on, the courts concluded that de­
spite the possible entrenchment incentives of 
management, if their predominant motive was in 
the best interest of the company, the manage­
ment's action would be upheld. 8 Of course this 
raised the legal and economic question of what 
constituted acting in the best interest of the 
company and what was persuasive evidence of 
it. 
As hostile takeover attempts increased, 
the question of permissible activity intenSified. 
Both raiders and incumbent managements de­
veloped techniques and strategies to thwart 
each other, many of which ended up in court for 
review when the affected party complained. 
Some strategies used by management were 
"shark repellants" (rendering the company pre­
emptively undesirable to some potential raider, 
e.g., by selling off valuable assets or putting in 
place some restrictive voting requirements), 
8 Cheff '0. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
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"white knights" (finding another company to 
outbid the raider but who was friendly to the 
incumbent management) and "greenmail" (au-
thorizing the use of company assets to buy the 
raider's stakehold of target's shares at a signifi-
cant premium on the condition of the raider's 
withdrawal.) Some techniques used by raiders 
were pre-emptive announcements of offers (to 
prevent management time to react), short time 
frames for bid offers (to force current share-
holders to decide quickly) and two-tiered offers 
(giving a high price to the first shares tendered 
and a sub-par price for the last shares in a sub-
sequent forced sale after the takeover's success 
and merger with target). 
The thrusts and parries of strategies were 
tested over time in the courts, forcing the courts 
to define more clearly what was in the best in-
terest of the corporation. The "best interests of 
the corporation" evolved into the "maximization 
of (current) shareholder value" and the courts' 
subsequent evaluations of actions were based on 
that criteria: (Did the nature of the offer coer-
cively force the shareholder to sell or to sell pre-
maturely against his or her best long term inter-
ests? 'Vas the management defense unwarrant-
edly preclusive of the shareholder's opportunity 
to exercise his or her own judgment as to what 
was the most valuable course of action?) Stat-
utes at both federal and state levels imposed 
rules and regulations to affect the course of a 
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Regulation of Hostile Takeovers 
hostile takeover effort in order to maximize cur-
rent shareholder value (disclosure rules, manda-
tory minimum durations of offers, withdrawal of 
tenders by shareholders permitted (so as to ac-
cept better offers clsewhere)) and the "best 
price rule" (all shareholdcrs receive the same 
best price regardless of changes in bid price to 
solicit more tenders).) (Williams Act and vari-
ous state takeover statutes.) 
The denouement was the development of 
rights plans ("the poison pill") which were 
amendments to corporate charters that auto-
matically triggered a dilution of a company's 
shares if a prelude to a hostile effort occurred. 
The effect was to make any hostile attempt pro-
hibitively expensive but also gave control to 
management to revoke "the pill" before it was 
triggered. This forced any prospective raider to 
negotiate directly with the target's management 
and reach a settlement before making any ten-
der offer could begin. Tested in the courts, "the 
poison pill" was found lawful as long as the 
management used it to maximize shareholder 
value (Moran v. Household Int'l, 1985), for ex-
ample, to secure a better bid from another com-
pany. These poison pills have sometimes been 
seen as contributing to the slowdown in hostile 
takeovers in the early 1990's though studies 
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have indicated otherwise (Coates IV, 2000).9 
Today approximately 85% of the companies 
listed on exchanges have adopted some form of 
rights plan. Though it is often suggested that 
managements have used the pill to extract some 
protection or compensations for themselves 
once a takeover is proposed, numerous studies 
indicate that regardless, the rights plans have 
increased significantly the premium the depart­
ing shareholders receive. to 
B. Hostile Takeover Regulation in the United 

States Today 

The issues debated in the U. S. today re­
volve around whether current regulations, stat­
utes and court rulings adequately insure maxi­
mization of shareholder wealth while permitting 
the market forces to discipline firms into main­
taining economic efficiency.ll Generally, hostile 
takeovers are viewed as playing an important 
role in disciplining the participants in the mar­
ketplace to be efficient. The underlying thread 
of all the hostile takeover debates is that given 
its expense and the offer of above-market-price 
9 John C. Coates IV, "Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover 

Defenses: \Vhere Do We Stand?," 54 University of Miami Law 

Review 783 (2000). 

10 [d.; R. Comment & G. Schwcrt, "Poison or Placebo? Evidence 

on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modem Antitakeover 

Measures," 39 Journal ofFinancial Economics 1 (1995). 

11 Stephen Choi, "Regulating Investors Not Issuers: a Mar­

ket-based Proposal," 88 California Law Review 279 (2000). 
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premium to current shareholders, a hostile 
takeover effort would not arise if there were not 
significant economic efficiency gains (and there­
fore profits) to be made by the acquirer which 
are not being exploited by current management. 
Particular attention is paid to the impediments 
of the poison pill towards that end and how the 
courts permit its useY Additional questions are 
whether the current statutory regulations un­
duly burden potential acquirers, inhibiting their 
ability to move efficiently in taking over a firm 
when indeed it is economically warranted. l3 
C. Federal VS. State Control 
In effect - legislatively and jurispruden­
tially - the United States has evolved a standard 
for the regulation and review of hostile take-over 
activity that is largely uniform across the states, 
though the impact of the variations that do exist 
among the states' takeover statutes are still the 
subject of debate. At the federal level, the Wil­
liams Act of 1968 amended the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934, creating federal regulation 
of hostile takeover activity by both the acquiring 
and the target firms. The Act focuses on maxi­
mizing the information to and the ability of the 
12 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp, 651 A.2d 1361 (DeL 
1995). 
13 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, "A New Approach to 
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition," 87 Virginia Law 
Review Hl( 2001), 
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current shareholders faced with tender offers to 
make the best decisions with regard to the value 
of their shares. Subsequent to the passage of 
the \Villiams Act, a wave of state level statutes 
were passed to give directors of target compa­
nies powers of resistance to hostile bids beyond 
the Williams Act. After those statutes were de­
clared by various courts to be unconstitutional 
on the grounds that they interfered either with 
interstate commerce or with the federal su­
premacy of the \Villiams Act,14 the U.S. Supreme 
Court15 nevertheless paved the way for a second 
wave of state statutes to achieve similar results, 
by allowing states to couch the provisions em­
powering target managers in terms of the states' 
powers to regulate corporate governance. It is 
these variations among the states and their 
regulatory impact that remain the subject of de­
bate as to whether there is a need for more cir­
cumscribing federal regulation.16 
More notably, for the concerns of the 
European Union, regardless of the extent that 
there are explicit federal rules and jurispru­
dence as compared with state laws and court 
decisions, the issue of the impact of hostile 
takeovers on a particular state's well-being in 
--------..--...~-
14 See, e.g., Edgar '0. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982). 
15 CTS Corp. 'D. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 86-87 (1987). 
16 See generally, William C. Tyson, "The Proper Relationship Be­
tween Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers," 
66 Notre Dame Law Review 241 (1990). 
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the U. S. has played little role in any legislation 
or court opinions. Significant court decisions at 
the state level, (most notably Delaware) have 
had a persuasive impact on other state courts' 
decisions with regard to business law matters, 
and the conclusions of these courts emphasized 
maximizing the current shareholders' wealth, 
whether or not the shareholders were residents 
of the state. Little concern was given to the im-
pact that a takeover may have on the welfare of 
the community in which the business resides. 
Takeovers can sometimes lead to the closure of 
local plants and layoffs, thereby altering the 
daily life of the community. Though some court 
decisions stated that Boards of Directors could 
consider as a factor the impact on the commu-
nity in its decision to as whether to forestall a 
takeover offer (sometimes referred to as "stake-
holder rights"), the effect of such statements 
was relatively small. illtimately, the maximiza-
tion of the wealth of the current shareholders 
was the standard that held primacy in the 
evaluation any of the players' activities in take-
over struggles. 
Since maximizing current shareholders' 
value in the corporation disregards any commu-
nity impact and there is no causal or economic 
link between the shareholders' welfare and the 
community's welfare (except to the extent, in 
the rare event, that the shareholders themselves 
are residents), when shareholders decide and 
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are able to accept (if the withdrawal of a poison 
pill is required) an acquirer's offer to purchase 
their shares at a premium above the market 
price, the struggle is finished. The current 
shareholders walk away with the proceeds from 
their sale, the acquirer takes over the firm to its 
own advantage and the consequences to the 
employees and community in which the firm 
resides fall where they might. 
During the 80's, in the heyday of the hos-
tile takeovers in the U.S., news organizations 
and show business media spotlighted attention 
on the community fallouts from the waves of 
mergers and acquisitions. Acquirers were often 
portrayed as voracious greedy vultures picking 
on firms in a manner that destroyed a valuable 
company and/or valued ways of community life 
and doing so solely for the purpose of making 
money. One merely needs to think of popular 
movies on the subject produced at the time to 
have a sense of public perception: Big Business 
(1988, Comedy, Lily Tomlin, Bette Midler - a 
corporate struggle over whether to close down a 
factory that will also destroy a southern town's 
way of life); Other People's Money (1991, Com-
edy, Danny DeVito - corporate raider's efforts to 
acquire a local company that is the lifeblood of a 
New England community); and the most notori-
ous, 'Vall Street (1987, Drama, Michael Douglas, 
Charlie Sheen, Martin Sheen - young ambitious 
stock broker learns that his idol, a major corpo-
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rate raider, is really and can only bc greedy and 
unscrupulous in order to be successful.) Even 
in Pretty Woman (1990, Julia Roberts, Richard 
Gere) , the hero, a successful, albeit ethically 
questionable, corporate raider, is psychologi-
cally redeemed when he decides to keep one 
corporate acquisition intact and build it up fur-
ther instead of selling off its component parts for 
profit. These movies and others like them mir-
rored the sentiments held by the United States 
public at large regarding the disruption to cor-
porations' and people's lives that the waves of 
corporate acquisitions and mergers had caused. 
News media gave similarly heart-rendering sto-
ries of families' and communities' lives in up-
heaval as a result of shifts in corporate winds. 
Despite the popular sentiment of hostility 
towards (and fascination with) the corporate 
raiders and the concern for the disruption that 
such activities were perceived to cause, court 
deciSions and legislative efforts to regulate hos-
tile takeover activity did very little to address 
them. Roberta Romano, a leading U.S. scholar 
in takeover activity, found little or no evidence 
that state lobbyists or legislators were ever con-
cerned for the negative impact on their commu-
nities or employment as a result of takeover ac-
tivity. Indeed, their focus seemed to be solely 
on empowering the incumbent management 
with the capacity to forestall the success of ten-
der-offer bids, a move she notes has the poten-
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tial to benefit the incumbent management, who 
are local and operate in concert, at the expense 
of shareholders who tend to be dispersed and 
loosely if at all organized.17 Ultimately, the poi-
son pill and similar impediments to shareholder 
acceptance force the potential acquirer to nego-
tiate with management as to the terms of the 
acquisition. Management usually suggests that 
this secures the best price for shareholders, but 
there is also suspicion that management uses 
these tools to extract benefits for itself (for ex-
ample, lucrative severance benefits or promises 
to keep the management on). It is the extent to 
which the various state statutes regulating hos-
tile takeovers empowers the incumbent man-
agement to thwart shareholders from accepting 
tender offer bids and effectively extracting com-
pensation for themselves that are the subject of 
scholarly and policy debates. I8 
17 Roberta Romano, "Competition for Corporate Charters and 
the Lesson of Takeover Statutes," 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 854-
S6 (1993). She suggests that most state takeover statutes were 
lobbied for by the management of firms who were either the tar-
get or potentially a target for an acquisition bid. She also noted 
that the local bar (of attorneys) of each state typically supported 
such lcgislation as well and she makes the pOint that onee a take-
over occurs, the acquirer continues to rely on its own legal 
cOlmsel and not the ones of the target. 
18 For example, see the articles presented at the University of 
Chicago 2002 Symposium on Executive Compensation and 
Takeover which continue the discussion. See, in particular: Jen-
nifcr Arlen, "Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover De-
fenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen 
Contingencies," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 917; Lucian Bebohuk, "The 
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers," 69 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 973; Maroel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, "How I Learned to 
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Nevertheless, but for the issue of man-
agement compensation, it is the use of the 
maximization of current shareholder value as 
the benchmark for review that renders regula-
tion of takeover activity essentially uniform 
across the United States, regardless of whether 
one looks at federal or state regulation. 
III. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
A. The Advent of Cross-Border Hostile 
Takeovers 
Hostile takeovers were not a focus in 
Europe until 1987 when the Italian entrepre-
neur Carlo De Benedetti sought to acquire Bel-
gium's crown jewel of business: Societe Gener-
ale de Belgique. Since then, the incidents of 
takeovers have increased dramaticallyl9 not only 
in crossing national boundaries but in increas-
ing in financial significance as well. The largest 
takeover in history was the acquisition by UK's 
Vodafone of Germany's Mannesmann in 1999. 
-------------- -~-----
Stop Worrying and Love The Pill: Adaptive Responses to Take-
over Law," 69 U. Chi. L. Re'O. 871; and Martin Lipton, "Pills, 
Polls, and Professors Redux," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037 
19 Yvette Merchiers, "De bescherming van minderheden in 
rechtspersonen" (Protection of the Rights of Minority Sharehold-
ers) in X., Rechtspersonenrecht, Postuniversaitaire CJ'Clus Willy 
Delva 1998-1999, Gent, Mys & Breesch, 1999, 259-307. 
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Interestingly, the rise of hostile takeovers in 
Europe ooinoides with the EU's effort to harmo-
nize oompany law throughout its member na-
tions. As a result, oonsiderable attention has 
fooused on hostile takeover regulation not only 
by scholars but by legislators and policy-makers 
among the European nations and within the 
European Union itself. As noted earlier, despite 
efforts from many quarters, the EU's Takeover 
Directive was voted down after 12 years of what 
appeared to be extremely suooessful negotia-
tions among member nations, refleoting the di-
vergenoe of opinion among the nations as to 
how they want to protect and facilitate their 
oompanies' activities. As already stated, it was 
olear that Germany's experienoe of the takeover 
of Mannesman by British Vodaphone had a ma-
jor impact on the vote on the EU direotive. 
What is important to appreoiate is that 
when a oompany is taken over by another in an 
international oontext, the new owners of the 
target oompany are usually not natives of the 
country of residenoe of the aoquired oompany. 
So now Mannesmann, a German company, is no 
longer German owned, it is owned by a British 
company. It still employs Germans, it still re-
sides in Germany, but it is now owned by for-
eigners. Sooiete Generale de Belgique was not 
only one of the most signifioant oompanies in 
the Belgium eoonomy but it was also a source of 
national pride. Though De Benedetti's efforts 
[180] IUS GENTIUM· Fall 2003 
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...­
were thwarted, ultimately Societe Generale 
through the defensive tactic of finding a 'Vhite 
Knight now has French owners. 
B. 	 The Economic Goals of the EU and Takeover 
Regulation 
1. The Goals in General 
One of the oldest economic theories that 
has driven most modernizations of economies is 
that freedom of trade produces economic gains 
for all participants, whether they are individu­
als, companies, or nations; that each participant 
to a freely negotiated transaction comes away 
better off than before.20 Furthermore, the en­
hancement of the well-being of some ultimately 
translates into the enhancement of well-being of 
many as the increases in income increases pur­
chases from others thereby increasing their in­
come.21 This leads to economic growth and is 
considered a hallmark of the benefits of eco­
nomic efficiency. 
One of the underlying motives of the EU 
has been to create a larger union consisting of 
member nations, so they can take advantage of 
20 This goes back as far as Adam Smith's invisible hand theory in 
his "Wealth of Natiol1s" (Modern Library Edition, 1937). 
21 This is the famous "multiplier effect" first promulgated by 
John Maynard Keynes in GE~ERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYME~T, 
INTEREST Al'lD MONEY (1936). 
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the economic power and growth this could gen­
erate and improve all member nations' econo­
mies and well-being. The founders of the ED 
recognized from the beginning that in order to 
be successful in their goals, they would need a 
free flow of capital, goods, services and people 
among the member nation states, and they in­
cluded these principles in the agreements 
signed.22 The European nations have long been 
the subject of criticism for their legal and struc­
tural impediments to the free movement of eco­
nomic forces that would take advantage of these 
potential economic gains. 23 The European na­
tions each had their own restrictions on the flow 
of resources, goods and services through tariffs, 
import-export quotas, rules on the structures of 
companies and immigration laws among other 
aspects. To overcome the effect of these obsta­
cles, efforts to harmonize of laws among the 
several nations of the ED also included the goal 
of reducing the barriers to trade among the 
member nations. 
2. The Takeover Friction 
Along with the reduction in barriers to 
22 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 

March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.8. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome), 

Art. 3. 

23 See generally, Jonathan S. Chester, The Proposed Regulation 

of Corporate Tender Qffers in the European Community, 12 

N.Y.L. Soh. J. Int'} & Compo L. 481 (1991). 
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trade also came the reduction in impediments to 
hostile takeovers that crossed national bounda-
ries. The effect of this on national psychology 
may not have been adequately anticipated. Dif-
ferent nations now within the EU, as a result of 
feeling "invaded" by other countries' corporate 
entrepreneurs, have taken to questioning 
whether indeed they want to remove all barriers 
to the free flow of productive resources. Part of 
what enabled Societe Generale de Belgique to 
fend off the Italian entrepreneur De Benedetti's 
efforts to acquire shareholder control was the 
willingness of French executives and officials to 
join forces with Societe Generale because of 
their own anger at Italian in-roads into owner-
ship of French companies. In the end, $3 billion 
was spent collectively by all sides in this take-
over war, resulting in De Benedetti's defeat and 
French ownership of the company. Societe Gen-
erale itself was only worth about half that 
amount according to share market prices. 
Though the effect of the hostile takeover 
efforts regarding Societe Generale made it clear 
that the European nations needed to put in 
place rules and regulations regarding such ac-
tivities (the UK was at the time the only nation 
that had any effective regulation of takeover ac-
tivity), it also made clear that the inherent 
structure of companies themselves needed to be 
re-examined, nation by nation, because the 
structures themselves often prohibited frce 
IUS GENTIUM· Volume 9 [183] 
Barbara White 
movements of resources that would serve to 
"discipline" existing corporations into becoming 
more efficient.24 Issues such as the percentage 
of company ownership that is closed and not 
public ally traded, the degree of leverage (i.e., 
the extent the corporation is financed through 
loans rather than equity), the extent to which 
large institutional banks finance companies giv-
ing them tremendous control over market 
forces, and regulations limiting shareholders' 
right to vote, are among the many factors of 
company structure that are seen to limit the 
free flow of trade and the concomitant forces of 
market-induced efficiency in inducing compa-
nies to be more productive. 
But what is also clear is that national 
pride has served to introduce new factors for 
consideration in addition to the goal of achiev-
ing unfettered (or at least "less fettered") mar-
ket dynamics. Making the company structure 
more liquid and more mobile also introduced it 
to vulnerability to hostile takeovers. Examining 
Germany's actions prior to the European Par-
liament's vote on the ED Directive for regulating 
Hostile takeovers and Germany's decisions after 
the vote failed to adopt the directive are instruc-
--.-.---~-------------
24 The prevailing view as to why Societe Generale became a tar-
get to a hostile take-over is that is was poorly run with inefficient 
management. See Jonathan Kapstein et al., How Di Benedetti 
Botched the "Battle of Belgium", Bus. Wk., Mar. 7, 1988, at 44-46. 
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tive, particularly when compared to United 
States state takeover statutes in conjunction 
with the United States Williams Act. 
3. The Case of Germany and the Failure of EU 
Takeover Directive 
Upon the aftermath of the Vodaphone 
takeover of Mannesman in 1999, Germany de-
cided to implement mandatory takeover regula-
tion which had not been in place before. Most 
of the proposed law had goals similar to the Wil-
liams Act in the United States. It sought to 
make information available to shareholders, to 
give them reasonable time to decide and other 
measures. Most of the design was to follow the 
principle of maximizing current shareholder 
value. However, one area that was in contro-
versy was the extent to which the target boards 
could adopt defensive measures in face of a hos-
tile bid. Though the German advisory commis-
sion for the act leaned heavily towards restrict-
ing board actions to maintaining positions of 
neutrality during a takeover bid, German politi-
cians, trade associations and members of indus-
try objected fairly strenuously and wanted the 
scope of the board's powers greatly enlarged to 
enable them to resist hostile bids. Ultimately a 
compromise position was adopted which en-
abled target boards to adopt defensive measures 
under some limited restrictions and with the 
caveat that if the measures fell within the scope 
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of authority of the shareholders, the measures 
had to be approved by the current shareholders. 
However, these measures could be adopted in 
advance of any particular bid, allowing the 
board to take pre-emptive defensive actions and 
outside the context of an potentially attractive 
tender offer. 
Simultaneously, Germany also focused on 
what was transpiring regarding takeovers at the 
level of the European Union. Germany pro­
posed a measure to be included in the discus­
sions forming the European Union's own Take­
over Directive. Like Germany's statute, the EU's 
Takeover Directive was also developing along 
United States lines in that the provisions were 
oriented towards the maximizing of shareholder 
value. The measure Germany proposed was to 
permit target boards broad latitude in adopting 
defensive measures. The proposal was intro­
duced in the latter stages of the EU Conciliation 
Proceedings but was ultimately rejected. Even 
though the EU draft had adopted 15 amend­
ments to allow for national differences, it main­
tained its strongly held position that target 
boards behave neutrally in the face of a hostile 
bid. Hence while Germany was developing its 
own takeover statute that granted powers to tar­
get boards to take defensive measures in the 
face of a hostile bid, the ED was developing a 
takeover directive under the principle of board 
neutrality, rejecting suggestions of giving boards 
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more latitude. 
illtimately when the EU Takeover Direc­
tive was put before the European Parliament on 
July 4 2001, the Parliament came to a deadlock 
decision, Germany being one of the negative 
votes cast. In the meantime Germany's own 
Takeover Act, which allowed for defensive tac­
tics by target boards, was passed in the German 
legislature on November 2001 and came into 
force in January, 2002. 
Currently, there is no EU Takeover Direc­
tive in force and a new proposal for the EU is 
being developed. This proposal still maintains 
the same basic approach of constraining the tar­
get board to neutrality. The one exception to 
the rule of neutrality the new proposal intro­
duces is that target boards can take defensive 
measures but only upon shareholder approval 
and only after a bid has been made and the 
shareholders are fully apprised of its nature. 
This gives little teeth to the power of the board 
to resist offers. It basically rests on whether the 
shareholders as a voting group want to reject the 
current offer and believe that the current board 
can some how do better for them, either in se­
curing a better offer or managing the company 
to yield greater profits. Whether this revised 
proposal will succeed remains to be seen. It will 
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probably not be put before a formal vote until 
the year 2005. 25 
IV. EU's HARMONIZATION VS. SUBSIDIARITY CONTRA 

U.S. FEDERAL VS. STATES RIGHTS: TAKEOVER 

REGULATION 

Ironically, the direction of the EU Take­
over Directive is precisely consistent with the 
preferences of the American critics of the cur­
rent U. S. system. Many U.S. scholars feel the 
state-level takeover statutes that empower 
boards of directors to resist offers are not only 
self-serving for the board at the cost of share­
holder wealth but also economically inefficient 
for the economy as a whole. Such board powers 
interfere with the market discipline of corporate 
management: the threat of hostile takeovers in­
duce management to run the company more ef­
ficiently or face the possibility of being pushed 
out. This is at the heart of the criticism of the 
state takeover statutes among the states of the 
United States and it is the heart of the orienta­
tion of the EU Directives in favor of board neu­
trality. 
However, as noted in the beginning of this 
25 For an overview comparison of the German Takeover Statute 
\vith the EU Takeover Directive and their respective histories, see 
Daniela Favoccia, Recent Developments in German JH&A Trans­
actions, 1347 PLI/Corp 955 (2002). 
[188] IUS GENTIUM· Fall200J 
Regulation of Hostile Takeovers 
essay, when the criticism is raised with regard 
to the United States and the various states' take-
over statutes, any concern for protection from 
owners of another state does not loom very large 
on the radar screen of considerations. Though 
some bemoan the loss of a way of life, the con-
cerns for the lost culture or community, seem to 
fade rather easily. In the United States, these 
cultures and communities do not have centuries 
of history behind them. On the other hand, 
among the European nations, the free flow of 
resources, services and people often means an 
invasion by peoples from one culture by owner-
ship of enterprises in another culture. And in 
this instance the cultures are identities that go 
back very far. 
It is not clear what the fallout of a poten-
tial melting pot of such diverse and longstanding 
cultures will be. Based on economic efficiency 
arguments, the members of the ED may have to 
make a choice in the trade-off between more 
economic well-being and the preservation of na-
tional and cultural identity. There is some evi-
dence that countries are indeed willing to sacri-
fice some economic gains for the preservation of 
a way of life. Certainly Germany's current take-
over regulations empowering the boards of di-
rectors to resist hostile bids reflect that choice. 
But in doing so, they not only risk some loss of 
economic advances but also the potential for 
boards to use these powers for their own eco-
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nomic gain.26 
IV. HOSTILE TAKEOVER LAW IN THE FUTURE 
A. Varying perspectives 
Although shareholder wealth maximiza­
tion is the most widely held paradigm for pro­
moting maximum economic growth and effi­
ciency, it is not altogether clear that it is the 
only one that will achieve economic ends. Cer­
tainly the underlying principle of unfettered 
markets has over time been modified with con­
straints to deal with a number of social values 
such as: preventing pollution, preserving natural 
habitats, avoiding destructive goods such as 
(now illegal) drugs, providing health care, a high 
level research, education, armed services, regu­
lation of communications, securities, private 
property, public goods, and criminal activity. 
Though the criticisms of interference in the 
market-place tend to hold up the paradigm of 
unfettered markets in the abstract, it is clear 
that in the reality, no one believes in truly un­
regulated market places. Which constraints one 
26 Despite Mannesmann's strenuous fight against Vodaphone's 
takeover, ultimately its CEO, Klaus Esser, recommended that the 
shareholders accept Vodaphone's increased offer. However, 
Esser was promised 30 million Euros from the new combined en­
tity (1 Euro is roughly $1 depending on the exchange rates of the 
moment.) Charles M. Nathan & Michael R Fischer, "An Overview 
of Takeover Regimes in the United Kingdom, France And Ger­
many," 1347 PLI/Corp 1163, 1195 (2002). 
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might support may vary with the political per­
spective of the individual, but perfect unregu­
lated markets are not in fact held as the ideal 
path to the best social and economic welfare. 
This probably holds, in particular, for optimal 
takeover regulation. 
Certainly, there is still enough support for 
deviations from the perfect shareholder maximi­
zation modeL27 Various analyses focusing on 
global aspects of takeover regulation span the 
spectrum of whether the shareholder maximiza­
tion model \\ill naturally predominate an ulti­
mate universal modes or whether structural and 
political differences will determine different 
(sub-optimal) outcomes.29 Some assert that 
Europe (and the world) will inevitably gravitate 
to the U.S. model,3o while others assert that the 
initial differences in different economies will 
perpetuate differences even as nations evolve 
27 In addition to some of the articles mentioned in footnote 8, 
see also Mark J. Roe, "Can Culture Constrain the Economic 
:vlodel of Corporate Law?," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1251(2002); Mark 
J. Loewenstein, "Stakeholder Proteotion in Germany and Japan", 

76 Tnl. L. Rev. 1673 (2002); and Henry Hansmann & Reinier 

Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law", 89 Geo. L. J. 

439,458 (2001). 

28 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for 

Corporate Law", 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 (2001). 

29 Mark J. Roe, "Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics," 

109 Harvard. I.-aw Review 641 (1996). 

30 Robcrta S. !\armel, "Is it Time for a Federal Corporation 

Law?," 57 Brooklyn Law Review 55, 90 (1991). 
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globally,31 A number of studies have examined 
differences in economic structure: thc degree of 
shareholder diffusion compared with concen­
trated blocks of controlling coalitions32 or the 
liquidity of a nation's securities markets and its 
relationship to concentration of ownership,33 
Some examine the differences in corporate gov­
ernance: the role shareholders play in direct de­
cision making/4 the role financial intermediaries 
play35 and the role unions play,3S Some look at 
political and governmental institutions: the im­
31 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, "A Theory of Path De­
pendence in Corporate Ownership and Governance," S2 Stan
ford Law Review 127 (1999). 
32 William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, "Comparative Corpo­
rate Governance and the Theorv of the Firm: The Case 
Against Global Cross Reference,.,- 38 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 213 (1999); European Corporate Govern­
ance Network, "The Separation of Ownership and Control: A 
Survey of Seven European Countries," (1997). 
33 R. La Porta, F, Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 
"Legal Determinants of External Finance," S2 Journal of Fi­
nance, 1131 (1997); R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. 
Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, "Law and Finance," Journal of Po
litical Economy, 106 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, "Measuring 
the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: 
Toward a More Scientific Approach," 10 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 16 (1998); Bernard S. Black & John C. 
Coffee, Jr., "Hail Britannia'?: Institutional Investor Behavior 
Under Limited Regulation," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 (1994). 
34 Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Pathways to Corporate Convergence? 
Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Ger­
many," 5 Columbia Journal ofEuropean Law_219 (1999). 
35Ronald J. Gilson, "Corporate Governance and Economic Effi­
ciency: When Do Institutions Matter?," 74 Washington Univer 

sity Law Quarterly 327 (1996). 

36 Guido Ferrarini, "Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the 

Contestability of Corporate Control," Company Law Reform 

in OECD Countries. A Comparative Outlook of Current 

Trends, Conference Proeeedings (forthcoming 2001). 
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pact of EU activities/ the reach of U.S. laws 
abroad38 and comparisons of different nations' 
regulations of takeovers39 or the impact of law 
itself40 in providing protection and disruptions. 
Some analyses consider the transportability of 
statutory regulation across nations and whether 
transplants of legal and structural features from 
one political and economic culture to another 
will yield success. 41 
Debates range over which industrial re­
gimes are superior to others, strong financial 
intermediaries versus liquid stock market, high 
37 Nihat Aktas, Erio de Bodt, & Michel Levasseur, "The Informa­

tion Impact of thc European CommiSSion Interventions In the 

Field of Merger and Aoquisition Monitoring: The Economics Be­

hind Information Flow Coming to the Market," Institut 

d'Administration et de Gestion, Universite Catholique de Lou­

vain, (2001). 

38 Merritt B. Fox, "Securities Disclosure in a GlobaIizing Market: 

Who Should Regulate Whom," 95 Michigan Law Review 2498 

(1997); Merritt B. Fox, "The Political Eoonomy of Statutory 

Reach: U.s. Disclosure Rules in a GlobaIizing Market for Securi­

ties," 97 },Iichigan Law Review 696 (1998). 

39 Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran, & David A. Christman, 

"Toward a Cohesive International Approaoh to Cross-border 

TakeoverRegulation," 51 University of Miami Law Review 823 

(1997). 

40 John C. Coffee, Jr., "The Future as History: The Prospects 

for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Im­

plications," 93 Northwestern Law Review 641 (1999). 

41 William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, "Comparative Corpo­

rate Governance and the Theorv of the Firm: The Case 

Against GlobaI Cross Reference",- 38 Columbia Journal of 

Transnational Law_213 (1999); Roberta Romano, "A Cau­

tionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate 

Law," 102 Yale Law Journal 2021 (1993). 
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concentration versus diffuse ownership, protec­
tion of management versus facilitation of raid­
ers. The views as to what forms and contexts 
are superior have changed over time as once 
flourishing countries such as Japan and Ger­
many, whose corporate regime was far more in­
stitutionally controlled than the U.S., have sub­
sequently fallen are harder times while the 
U.S.'s economy began to bloom again.43 \Vith the 
economic rise and fall and rise again of different 
countries' economies, each under a different 
regulatory and structural environment, it is now 
clear that it is not unambiguous that one model 
of corporate governance and economic struc­
tural environment is superior to another. Fur­
thermore, this conclusive non-conclusion arises 
especially in the context of evaluating success in 
purely economic wealth-maximizing terms. 
B. The questions that need to be asked 
It is important to recognize the possibility 
that a multiplicity of economic contexts can co­
exist internationally44 without interfering with 
42 Geoffrey Miller, "Political Structure and Corporate Govern­
ance: Some Points of Contrast between the United States and 
England," 1998 GolumbiaBusiness Law Review 52. 
43 John C. Coffee, Jr., "The Future as History: The Prospects 
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Im­
plications," 93 Northwestern Law Review 641 (1999). 
44 Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran, & David A. Christman, 
"Toward a Cohesive International Approach to Cross-border 
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overall global efficiency. Furthermore it is quite 
plausible that this co-existing multiplicity of 
economic regimes may also possess the flexibil­
ity to incorporate other social values in con­
junction with economic measures of the nation's 
welfare and to do so without compromising its 
economy's efficiency to compete internationally. 
Certainly the suggestions of a number of authors 
at the very least do not preclude that possibil­
ity.45 On a practical level, it is evident that these 
other social values play a significant role in de­
termining policy, not only among the several 
nations of the ED but within the ED itself. 
Global economic policy considering hostile 
takeovers will have to take European sensibili­
ties into account. 
TakeoverRegulation," 51 University of Miami Law Review 823 

(1997). 

45 Roberta Romano, "Empowering Investors: a Market Approach 

to Securities Regulation," 107 Yale Law Journal 2359 (1998); 

Frank J. Garcia, "Protecting Nonshareholder Interest in the Mar­

ket for Corporate Control: A Role for State Takeover Statutes," 

23 University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform 507 (1990). 
IUS GENTIUM· Volume 9 [195] 
